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6.1  Introduction 
In the early sixties, developing countries started to move away from 
import-substitution strategies. Gradually, these were replaced by  out- 
ward-looking strategies that emphasized the importance of manufactured 
exports in the process of industrialization and development. In order to 
expand their nontraditional exports, the developing nations socght to 
improve their market access, especially through the reduction of  tariff 
and nontariff barriers in the industrialized countries. At that time, one 
opportunity to achieve better market access was the GATT-sponsored 
Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations for which preparatory work was 
under  way.  However,  the developing  countries  contested  the  fun- 
damental  GATT principle  of  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment 
whereby a country cannot tax imports of  the same item from different 
countries at different rates. They argued that equal treatment of unequal 
partners could not constitute an equitable arrangement. The developing 
nations therefore asked for special and preferential treatment in their 
favor without reciprocity of  concessions on their part. 
During the GATT ministerial  meeting held in 1963, proposals  for 
special tariff treatment in favor of  developing countries were formally 
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discussed for the first time. While the developed countries agreed not to 
require reciprocal tariff cuts by developing countries, they did not accept 
the proposal that tariffs in developed countries should be cut more on 
imports from developing nations than on imports from other developed 
countries.  However, the debate  on  tariff  preferences was  reopened 
shortly thereafter at the first meeting of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD) in  early  1964. Among  the 
principles  it  adopted,  the  Conference recommended  that  developed 
countries grant preferential concessions to the developing nations with- 
out requiring reciprocal concessions. This recommendation was rejected 
by a group of industrialized countries, among whom the United States 
was the leading force.’ 
The U.S.  opposition to preferences at UNCTAD was supported by 
both free traders and protectionists in the country. The position of the 
former group was based on its determination to uphold the MFN princi- 
ple of  nondiscriminatory  treatment in trade. On the other hand, the 
protectionists were against tariff concessions in general because of their 
fear of  additional imports.  However, the official U.S. policy toward 
preferences gradually became untenable as “politically, [it found itself] 
virtually isolated  from  all the  developing countries and most of  the 
industrialized countries as well.”’ One of  the major fears of  the United 
States was the regionalization of world trade resulting from preferential 
trading  arrangements  between  the  European  Economic Community 
(EEC) and the developing countries. Accordingly, in 1967 the United 
States announced its acceptance of  the principle of  nondiscriminatory 
preferences for all developing countries. 
The shift  of  position  by  the United  States paved  the way  toward 
preferential tariff treatment in favor of developing nations. This principle 
was formally accepted at the second session of  UNCTAD held in 1968. 
Under the unanimously agreed upon Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), developing countries would be charged no duty for their exports 
to the industrialized  countries,  while  each  developed country would 
continue to levy the MFN tariff on products from other industrial coun- 
tries.  The GSP would thus provide  the developing countries with  a 
margin of  preference equal to the MFN tariff in the industrialized na- 
tions. 
In  1969 a  Special  Committee  of  Preferences was  established  by 
UNCTAD to conduct the necessary negotiations for actually establishing 
the GSP. Despite this effort at international coordination, the work on 
drawing up GSP schemes proceeded mainly on the national level so that, 
eventually, each so-called donor country applied a somewhat different 
scheme and introduced it at a different time. One last problem remained 
before actually implementing the GSP. The MFN clause of article 1  of the 
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Hence, the contracting parties of  GATT voted a ten-year waiver from 
article 1  in June 1971. The next month the EEC was first to introduce its 
system of  preferences. Other countries followed suit soon afterward and, 
lastly, the United States introduced its GSP program in January 1976. 
The delay in the introduction of  a GSP scheme by the United States 
reflects the generally negative  attitude toward preferences which has 
prevailed in this country. The opposition of  both free traders and protec- 
tionists, as well as the political nature of  the U.S. endorsement of  the 
GSP, are reflected in the language of Title V of the 1974  Trade Act which 
provides the guidelines for the U.S. scheme. Section 501, which grants 
the president the authority to extend preferences, requires him to do so 
with due regard to: 
(1)  their effect on the economic development of developing countries; 
(2)  their likely impact on U.S. producers; and 
(3)  the extent of similar preferences being granted by the other major 
Clearly point (1) is addressed to the free traders who defend the view that 
a nondiscriminatory reduction in MFN tariff rates would be more bene- 
ficial to these countries (and the world) than the GSP. Point (2), on the 
other hand, is directed at the protectionists who fear the impact of  the 
scheme on U.S. producers. Finally, point (3) makes clear the foreign 
policy basis for the U.S. acceptance of the GSP. 
As we will see in greater detail in section 6.2, the U.S. GSP scheme is 
subject to a number of restrictions affecting its country coverage, product 
coverage, and the extent of  preferential treatment. Moreover, section 
505 of the 1974  Trade Act prescribes that the U.S. scheme will terminate 
ten  years after the date of  its enactment  (i.e.,  on 3 January  1985). 
Although the GSP will probably be renewed for another ten-year period, 
its future shape remains uncertain at the moment.' Some changes to the 
system were already made following the mandated report on its first five 
years of operation, and more are expected before Congress approves its 
renewal." In order to decide on the future of  the GSP, a review process 
was launched in 1983. 
The object of  this paper is to provide useful input into the decision- 
making process on the future of  GSP. In order to do so, we need to 
answer the following questions: 
(1)  What has been the effect of the GSP on the exports by the develop- 
ing countries to the United States and how has this effect been 
distributed among individual beneficiaries? 
(2)  What has been the impact of  the GSP on production in different 
industrial sectors in the United States? 
(3) What would be the trade and production effects of the changes in 
the GSP being considered by policymakers? 
The plan  of  the paper is as follows. In section 6.2, we review the 
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provisions of the U.S. GSP. After discussing methodological questions in 
section 6.3, an evaluation of  the GSP impact on trade and production is 
undertaken in section 6.4. Finally, section 6.5 summarizes our results and 
examines the potential effects on trade and production of changes in the 
GSP scheme. 
6.2  Provisions of the U.S. GSP 
The GSP schemes introduced by the industrialized countries vary in 
terms of country coverage, product coverage, and the extent of preferen- 
tial treatment. In the previous section we outlined the political-economic 
background of the U.S. decision to grant preferences to the developing 
countries. Here we will describe the actual provisions of  the U.S. GSP 
and discuss them with reference to that background.  As will become 
apparent, the GSP is a very complex institution. Therefore, it is impor- 
tant to review and understand its functioning before attempting to evalu- 
ate its impact and before discussing possible future changes in its opera- 
tion. 
6.2.1  Country Coverage 
Section 502 of the 1974 Trade Act deals with the notion of  a “benefi- 
ciary developing country.” However, instead of enumerating the list of 
developing countries that can benefit from the U.S. GSP, it outlines 
conditions that should guide the president in determining whether to 
designate any country a beneficiary developing country. These are as 
follows: (1) a request by the country to be so designated; (2) the level of 
economic development of  such country; (3) whether or not the other 
major developed countries extend their GSP scheme to the country; (4) 
the extent to which the country has assured the United States  of equitable 
and reasonable access to its market and basic commodity resources. 
Even if a country meets these four conditions, section 502 specifies  that 
the president shall not designate it as beneficiary in any of the following 
cases: it is a communist country; it participates in international commod- 
ity cartels, such as OPEC; it affords preferences to another developed 
country causing a significant adverse effect on U.S. commerce; it has 
expropriated U.S. property without compensation; it refuses to cooper- 
ate with the United States to prevent narcotics from entering this coun- 
try; and it fails to recognize or enforce arbitral awards in favor of  U.S. 
citizens or firms? 
In practice, except for those countries that fall within one of the above 
exclusive categories, all developing countries have been beneficiaries of 
the U.S. GSPP So far, this has been true regardless of  their level of 
economic development. However, as we will see in greater details in 
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graduating the most advanced developing countries from GSP eligibility. 
Indeed, from its inception, there were those in the United States who 
favored the exclusion of  some advanced developing countries from the 
GSP scheme. However, politically this proved to be a problem in the 
international arena as the developing countries  opposed the idea  of 
discriminatory  treatment  among  themselves.  Moreover,  the  United 
States had to  take into account the fact that both the EEC  and Japan had 
granted beneficiary status to most of the advanced developing nations- 
even though many restrictions were attached to it. 
6.2.2  Product Coverage 
Although protectionist groups in the United States were not able to 
exclude the most competitive developing countries from GSP treatment, 
they did succeed in restricting the product coverage of the GSP.'  Section 
503 of the 1974  Trade Act, which relates to the eligibility of products, lists 
the following import-sensitive products as being ineligible for tariff pref- 
erences: (1) textile and apparel articles subject to textile agreements; (2) 
watches;  (3)  import-sensitive  electronic articles;  (4)  import-sensitive 
steel items; (5) footwear articles; (6) import-sensitive glass products;8  and 
(7) any other articles which the president determines to be import sensi- 
tive in the context of  the GSP. 
The regulations governing the administration of the GSP provide that 
any interested party may petition to have new articles either removed or 
added to the GSP list. Decisions are taken by  the president based on 
investigations by the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Com- 
mittee. As a result of  annual product reviews, 233 products have been 
added and 27 removed from the original list of 2,729 GSP-eligible items 
as of  31 March 19828 
6.2.3  Limitations on Preferential Treatment 
Rules of  Origin 
To prevent exports from nonbeneficiary countries from transiting via 
beneficiary  countries for  the sole purpose  of  GSP treatment,  donor 
countries have instituted a set of  rules of  origin. In the United States, 
duty-free treatment for GSP-eligible products applies only if (a) a prod- 
uct is imported directly from a beneficiary developing country into the 
United States; and (b) the sum of the cost or value of materials produced 
in the beneficiary country plus the direct costs of  processing equals at 
least 35 precent of  the value of  the product.'O  Although these rules are 
primarily intended to insure the proper operation of the GSP, in certain 
instances they also might serve a protectionist purpose. In particular, in 
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sponding to GSP margins by transferring production to beneficiary de- 
veloping countries." 
Competitive Need Limitations 
Under section 504 of  the 1974 Trade Act, a beneficiary developing 
country loses GSP duty-free  treatment for a particular product if  its 
exports to the United States exceeds (1) 50 percent of  the value of the 
total U.S. imports of the pr~duct;'~,'~  or (2) a certain dollar value adjusted 
annually in accordance with the growth of  the U.S. GNP.'4 The loss of 
preferences takes effect on 30 March of  the following year.'5 Reinstate- 
ment to GSP treatment may be considered if U.S. imports of that product 
from the excluded country fall below the competitive need limitations in 
subsequent years. Hence, during any given year (from 30 March to the 
following 29 March), imports of  a product from a beneficiary country 
enter the United States either entirely GSP duty-free or entirely at the 
MFN rate.'6 
It is often emphasized that competitive need limitations are designed to 
reserve the benefits of  the program for less competitive producers in 
not-so-advanced developing countries. However, it should also be recog- 
nized that these limitations are the result of domestic protectionist pres- 
sures. 
6.2.4  The Consequence of  Exclusions 
What is the importance of  the various exclusions presently built into 
the U.S. GSP scheme? A rough answer can be obtained by examining the 
trade flows presented in table 6.1. For instance, in 1978, U.S. imports 
from developing countries amounted to $75.9 billion. Out of  this sum, 
$62.0 billion were subject to MFN tariffs and, thus, constitute the poten- 
tial trade that could benefit from GSP treatment. However, because of 
restrictive country coverage, only $31.4 billion of dutiable imports from 
developing nations came from GSP beneficiaries."  Moreover, from this 
amount, only $9.7 billion was eligible for GSP treatment because of 
product  exclusions, most of  which covered items with relatively high 
MFN tariff  rates.  Finally, the implementation of  rules of  origin and 
competitive need limitations further reduced the actual GSP duty-free 
imports to $5.2 billion. This represents 8 percent of the dutiable imports 
from all developing countries and 17 percent of  the equivalent imports 
from the beneficiary countries alone. Thus, only a relatively small frac- 
tion of  the imports from developing countries fall under the GSP pro- 
gram. Moreover, as far as beneficiary countries are concerned, the MFN 
rate on excluded trade flows tends to be much higher than the preference 
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Table 6.1  U.S. Imports: Total, MFN Dutiable, and GSP Coverage (billions of 
dollars) 
~  ~ 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
From the world 
Total  119.5  145.5  170.7  210.0  245.0  260.0 
MFN dutiable  86.2  106.2  125.3  ma.  n.a.  n.a. 
From all developing countries 
Total  55.0  70.2  75.9  96.2  119.1  120.3 
MFN dutiable  45.6  58.0  62.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
From all GSP beneficiaries 
Total  28.1  34.7  41.4  51.2  63.5 
MFN dutiable  20.9  25.4  31.4  38.2  53.8 
GSP eligible trade  6.5  7.7  9.7  11.7  14.3 
50% limit  (0.7)  (0.8)  (1.0)  n.a.  n.a. 
dollar limit  (1.2)  (2.0)  (2.2)  n.a.  n.a. 
rules of  origin 
Exclusions 
and other"  (1.4)  (1.0)  (1.3)  (1.6)  (1.4) 
GSP duty-free trade  3.2  3.9  5.2  6.2  7.3 
SOURCE:  Office of  the U.S. Trade Representative. 
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6.3  Methodology 
Conceptually, a preferential tariff reduction (like the GSP) is similar to 
the formation of a customs union. Both give rise to the same static effects, 
described often as trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD). The TC 
effects corresponds to the displacement of  domestic production in the 
donor country in favor of  imports from beneficiary countries. The TD 
effect pertains to the substitution by the donor country of  imports from 
preferred  suppliers  for  imports  from  nonpreferred  countries.  If  we 
assume that U.S. apparent consumption is not affected by the change in 
tariffs, one dollar's worth of  imports will replace one dollar's worth of 
domestic production, and the impact on U.S. output and employment is 
then determined only by the trade creation effect. On the other hand, for 
beneficiary developing countries more significance is attached to the sum 
of the TC and TD effects, which reflects the total impact of  preferences 
on their exports. This sum is often referred to as gross trade creation 
(GTC). According to the theory of  customs unions, trade creation in- 
creases the welfare of  the donor country, since resources are transferred 
away from inefficient import-competing sectors. However, trade diver- 
sion implies a welfare loss, since imports are diverted from the most 
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Empirically, several methods have been used to estimate the trade 
creation  and  diversion  effects of  preferential  trading  arrangements.'8 
Among these methods, one can distinguish between ex ante and ex post 
methods.  The former  seek to study the effects of  preferential  tariff 
reductions in advance of their implementation. In addition to estimates of 
tariff  reduction,  ex ante methods require  estimates of  domestic and 
foreign  supply elasticities  as well  as of  own- and cross-price import 
demand elasticities. On the other hand, ex post methods seek to isolate 
the effect of preferential arrangements on actual trade flows from effects 
of  changes in other determinants of  trade. 
The choice between ex ante and ex post methods obviously depends on 
the task at  hand. In our particular case, the adopted methodology should, 
ideally, have the following properties: (i) it should provide estimates of 
the effect of  the present U.S.  GSP scheme by incorporating information 
on its actual functioning; and  (ii) it  should  give these  estimates for 
individual countries and individual products in such a way as to enable 
one to gauge the effects of  possible future changes in the GSP. 
The ex ante method was first used in the context of  the U.S. GSP by 
Baldwin and Murray (1977). Its primary advantage is that it is particularly 
well suited for investigating alternative hypothetical policies. However, 
besides the fact that it relies on rather rough elasticity estimates, this 
method suffers from another major drawback. In principle, the GSP 
provides the developing countries a margin of  preferential equal to the 
U.S.  MFN tariff which, hereafter, will be referred to as the theoretical 
preference margin (TPM). By definition, ex ante studies use TPMs to 
compute the trade effects of the GSP. However, as we have seen earlier, 
in practice rules of origin and competitive need limitations tend to reduce 
the amount of imports actually entering duty-free below the total level of 
imports from  GSP beneficiaries  ?9  Accordingly, the actual preference 
margin (APM) will be below the TPM. Hence, for the beneficiary coun- 
try i and the eligible product j,  we can write 
A..=p  .T.  (1)  Y  11  I ' 
where A and T correspond to AMP and TPM, respectively, andpV  is the 
proportion of U.S.  imports of product j from country i that actually enter 
GSP duty-free?O Thus, because they use theoretical instead of  actual 
preference margins, ex ante evaluations of  the GSP system will tend to 
overestimate its trade effects. This is likely to be true even if the analysis 
is adjusted by leaving out those trade flows that are a priori excluded from 
GSP treatment, as in Baldwin and Murray (1977), since this does not 
account for additional exclusions resulting from the restrictive operation 
of  the GSP rules. 
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an anti-monde (i.e., hypothetical trade flows corresponding to a situation 
of  unchanged tariffs), the difference being the tariff effect. The crucial 
element here is obviously the construction of  the anti-monde. One of the 
approaches to this problem has been to extrapolate trends in market 
shares from a period before to a period after the tariff change?’ 
Another approach consists of explicitly introducing a tariff variable in 
the analysis and statistically estimating the relationship between trade 
flows and tariff preferences. The main advantage of this method is that it 
provides a test of the statistical significance of tariff effects. Moreover, it 
does not require any elasticity estimates nor any nontestable assumption 
about the anti-monde. On the other hand, the weakness of this and other 
ex post methods is that in order to give reliable estimates they require a 
period during which the trade effects of tariff changes are relatively large 
compared to the effects of  other disturbances. 
The statistical analysis of the impact of GSP preferences on trade flows 
requires one to formulate models that are capable of explaining interna- 
tional trade flows by  a set of  factors that includes tariff  preferences. 
Recently a large number of empirical studies have addressed this issue 
with the help of  cross-section regression models. As Learner (1974) has 
pointed out, these models belong to two categories which are the dual of 
each other  They seek to explain trade flows either for particular products 
across countries or for particular countries across products.” 
For the purpose of  examining the trade impact of  the GSP, the first 
group of  models may be summarized as 
(2)  M, = F,(E,?  4,)  9 
where M,, 1s  the U.S.  import of  product j from country i, E,  is a vector of 
country i’s characteristics, and A,  is the actual preference margin defined 
earlier. The presence of this vector of country characteristics is a reflec- 
tion of the theory we adopt to explain comparative advantages: products 
use certain resources intensively and can be produced more cheaply by 
countries abundant in these resources. The GSP impact is indicated by 
the A,  coefficients obtained by estimating equation (2) for each product 
over a cross-section of countries comprised of both GSP beneficiaries and 
nonbenefi~iaries.2~ 
The second group of models may be expressed as 
(3)  M,  = G@,, A,)  9 
where E, is a vector of product j’s characteristics and the other variables 
are as previously defined. This vector of product characteristics reflects 
the dual of  the theory of  comparative advantages stated earlier: certain 
resources are abundant in some countries and these countries can pro- 
duce more cheaply those products that are intensive in the use of  these 204  Andre SapidLars Lundberg 
resources. Here the GSP effect may be derived from estimating equation 
(3) for each exporting country or group of countries over a cross section 
of  products. 
If  we postulate a simple constant-elasticity form for 4,  we may write 
equation (2) as 
m..=  a.+  P.e.+y.A..  (4)  11  I  I  1  I  ‘1’ 
where mii = log Mi,, and ei = log Ei.  For our purpose, it will be more 
convenient to formulate the model in terms of  market shares, that is: 
s.. = m.. -  c. = G. + P.e.  + ?.A,.  (5)  11  ‘I  I  I  I‘  111’ 
where sq  = log So,  cj = log Cj,  S, = Mq/Ci,  and Ci  is the apparent 
consumption of  product j  in the United States, and  OL,  = aj - cj. A 
significantly  positive yj indicates a GSP effect on U.S. imports of product 
j.  However, because ei  might possibly omit a variable correlated with A,, 
yj might reflect other factors besides the GSP. To check for this possibil- 
ity, we will also estimate equation (5) for a year before the GSP scheme 
was introduced. This gives the opportunity to test the hypothesis that yj is 
significantly positive after, but not before, the tariff change. In case y, 
turns out to be significantly positive in the pre-GSP year, we know that 
the model omits an additional explanatory variable, the effect of which is 
captured by A,. However, if this missing variable cannot be measured, 
and if  we are willing to assume that the bias in the A, coefficient is 
constant, the test for a GSP effect will be whether there is a significant 
increase of  over time. Such a method was applied by Sapir (1981) for 
evaluating the trade impact of  the European Community’s GSP. 
Another possibility of testing for a GSP effect is to formulate model (2) 
in terms of  changes in market shares from a year before to a year after 
preferences were introduced: 
(6)  (ASq) =  U, + bj(AEJ +  C,  E; + d,Ai,, 
where (ASq) and (AEJ refer to changes and the superscript O indicates a 
year before the GSP. One of  the deficiencies with cross-country regres- 
sions (5) and (6) is that, although the estimated yj and dj  indicate whether 
the GSP has a significant effect, they do not directly measure either its 
trade creating or its trade diverting effects. Essentially, this problem is 
caused by the absence of “normal trade” from those regressions, that is, 
trade not likely to be affected in any way by the GSP. 
As far as model (3) is concerned, in keeping with our previous discus- 
sion, it may be written as either 
s.. = a!  + P!e. + y!A..  (7)  11  I  1  J  I  119 
or 
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In these cross-product regressions, a significantly positive $  or di indi- 
cates gross trade creation due to the GSP if  i is a beneficiary country. On 
the other hand, if  i is a nonbeneficiary country, a significantly negative 
coefficient for A,  indicates trade diversion. The trade creation effect may 
be obtained either as the difference between GTC and TD, or from the 
coefficients yi  or dj when i stands for all exports to the United States. 
6.4  Impact of the U.S. GSP on Trade and Production 
In this section we will attempt to measure the effects of the GSP on the 
U.S. economy for 1979, the last year for which all the data required for 
our study were available. Our analysis will be divided into three parts. 
First, we present the actual GSP preference margins for 1979 by major 
beneficiary country. In addition, we briefly review the trend of penetra- 
tion into the U.S. market by beneficiary developing countries during the 
seventies. Second, we test whether the performance of beneficiary coun- 
tries in  the U.S.  market between 1975 and 1979 may be statistically 
related to the GSP program. Third, we present estimates of  the magni- 
tude of  the GSP’s impact on U.S. trade and production. 
6.4.1 
The possibility for beneficiary developing countries to expand their 
exports (and market shares) to the United States because of  the GSP 
depends, in the first place, on the amount of trade subject to MFN duties. 
According to this criterion, the main beneficiary exporters in 1979 were 
Taiwan, Mexico, Korea, Hong Kong, and Brazil (see table 6.2, col. [2]). 
Given the amount of  dutiable trade, the commodity structure and the 
GSP product coverage of  each beneficiary determine the extent of  its 
GSP eligible trade. Among countries included in table 6.2, these two 
factors have been relatively favorable for Chile, the Dominican Repub- 
lic, and Haiti all of  which have a high ratio of  GSP-eligible to MFN- 
dutiable trade. The opposite holds for Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
India. 
Besides the level of eligible trade, the potential effect of the GSP also 
depends on the size of the preference margin. This margin is potentially 
equal to the MFN duty on eligible products, of  which  the weighted 
average is shown in table 6.2, column (4).  However as we  have seen 
earlier, in practice due to various exclusions, beneficiary countries con- 
tinue to pay what might be called “GSP duties” on eligible products. 
Their weighted average appears in column (5). The difference between 
the MFN and GSP duties is the actual preference margin which, as the 
figures displayed in column (6) indicate, varies substantially across ben- 
eficiaries. As equation (1) reveals, this margin tends to be higher the 
larger the MFN duty and the larger the proportion of  eligible trade that 
Preference Margins and Market Shares Table 6.2  Imports, Duties and Preference Margins for Beneficiary Countries with over $100 Million of GSP-Eligible Imports, 1979 
Prefer- 
Duties and Preference on  ence 
Imports ($ millions)  Eligible Trade (%)  Ranking  Margin  Tariff 
on  Revenue 
MFN  GSP  Prefer-  Prefer-  Total  Forgone 
Duti-  Eligi-  MFN  GSP  ence  MFN  ence  Dutiable  ($ mil- 
Total  able  ble  Duty  Duty  Margin  (6):(4)  Duty  Margin  Trade(%) lions) 
































































































5.12  2.37 
2.87  6.35 
2.46  6.77 
6.06  3.94 
0.89  2.84 
3.19  1.78 
2.91  3.79 
2.85  4.77 
1.90  3.39 
1.43  5.32 
0.34  7.99 
5.74  0.93 
1.91  5.47 
2.94  4.04 
1.08  1.95 
0.75  6.53 
1.41  5.40 
6.14  2.48 




















7  15  0.83 
3  4  2.54 
2  2  1.99 
1  10  1.78 
17  13  1.45 
16  17  0.35 
13  11  0.93 
6  8  1.48 
15  12  1.66 
12  7  1.46 
5  1  3.66 
14  18  0.59 
8  5  2.03 
10  9  1.77 
18  16  1.81 
9  3  3.31 
11  6  2.42 
4  14  1.40 
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receives GSP treatment. In turn, this proportion is directly related to the 
application of  rules of origin and competitive need limitations. In gen- 
eral, one should expect rules of origin to affect mostly small and special- 
ized countries exporting highly processed  goods with  a high ratio of 
imported intermediate goods to sales value. On the other hand, competi- 
tive need  limitations should mainly affect large or highly specialized 
countries. The figures in column (7) indicate that the countries most 
adversely affected by these rules are the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and 
Mexico, while those least affected are Israel, Yugoslavia, and India. The 
actual margin of preference was the highest for Israel, Korea, and Yugo- 
slavia, and the lowest for the Dominican Republic, Malaysia, and Chile. 
The product of  the actual preference margin and the value of  GSP- 
eligible trade is the tariff revenue foregone by the United States on GSP 
trade. For a given volume of  imports and a given import price, this 
amount would  also indicate  the increase in  export  earnings by  ben- 
eficiaries as a result of  the GSP. If  we accept this as a rough estimate of 
export effects, column (11) in table 6.2 indicates that Taiwan, Korea, and 
Hong Kong obtained the most benefit in this sense from U.S. prefer- 
ences. However, this assumes that markets for imported goods are com- 
petitive: otherwise, part of this potential benefit for developing countries 
might be captured by powerful U.S. importers or intermediary  trader^.'^ 
Between 1975 and 1979,  the share of imports from GSP beneficiaries in 
U.S. consumption of manufactures increased from 1.77 to 2.49 per~ent.2~ 
Although relatively small on the aggregate level, the loss in market share 
to  GSP  countries by  U.S.  producers  is  unevenly  distributed  across 
products?" As indicated in table 6.3, this loss has been substantial for 
some products. Together, the top twenty products account for more than 
40 percent of the total loss of sales for the entire manufacturing sector. 
These changes in market shares may reflect the effects of  the GSP 
scheme. However, they are likely to reflect other factors as well. Except 
for a brief setback in 1975, the market share of  GSP countries for total 
manufactures increased  steadily during the seventies.  Therefore, the 
increase of the share since the beginning of the GSP scheme in 1976 is in 
part a continuation of  a previous trend reflecting a long-run change in 
comparative advantage for certain products in favor of  producers in 
developing countries. 
A very rough method of  assessing the importance of  the GSP is to 
assume that the trend  in  market  shares reflects long-run  changes in 
international competitiveness, while positive deviations from the trend 
after 1976 for GSP countries indicate the effects of  the GSP. Unfortu- 
nately, the period 1972-79 has been subject to economic shocks affecting 
trade, such as the oil crisis, the  1974 recession,  and major currency 
realignments. Hence, it is difficult to isolate the long-run factors to give a 
reliable estimate of  GSP effects. The trend-adjusted losses reported in 208  Andre SapidLars Lundberg 
Table 6.3  Loss of Market Share by U.S. Producers to GSP Beneficiaries for 
Twenty Products with the Largest Losses 
SIC 
Code  Description 
Loss in Market 
Share, 1975-79 
(percentage points)  1979 Market 
Share (%) 
Actual  Adjusted  Countries 





























Games and toys 




Radios and TVs 
Leather tanning 
Personal leather goods, nec. 
Copper foundries 
Nonferrous foundries, nec. 
Electronic capacitors 
Sporting goods 





























































table 6.3 indicate that, for most of the industries listed, the GSP may have 
played an important role in accounting for the decline in market shares?’ 
However, it is likely that the residuals still contain effects of other factors. 
Recovery from the 1974 recession has probably tended to increase mar- 
ket shares for imported products in general. In addition, it is possible that 
the increase  in  competitiveness  for  developing  countries  during the 
seventies accelerated during 1976-79.  In any case, besides being rather 
crude, trend methods suffer from the fact that they do not permit statisti- 
cal tests of  their results. 
6.4.2  Testing for GSP Effects 
The Cross-Country Model 
In this section, model (2), the cross-country regression, will be used to 
test for the existence of  a GSP effect on the country pattern of  U.S. 
imports for a sample of products. Besides the preference variableAq,  the 
model should contain the main determinants of trade flows from different 209  U.S.  Generalized System of Preferences 
countries to the United States. Variables often used in gravity models of 
international trade are measures of  supply capacity, such as GNP or 
population in the exporting country, and of the distance between trading 
partners, to reflect transport  costs. In this study we have used  total 
exports of  manufactures of  a country to measure  supply capacity. In 
addition, we have introduced the ratio of the stock of U.S. direct invest- 
ment in the exporting country to the country’s GNP as an indicator of its 
economic ties with the United States. 
Relative factor endowments will influence the country pattern of U.S. 
imports. For labor-intensive standard products with low-skill require- 
ments, U.S. imports are likely to be large from countries where physical 
and human  capital  are relatively scarce.  Accordingly, we  include in 
model (2) country measures of the physical capital/labor ratio as well as a 
measure of  human  capital.= For capital-intensive and technically ad- 
vanced industries, however, U.S. imports are likely to come from coun- 
tries where physical and human capital is abundant. The expected signs  of 
the factor endowment variables will thus depend on the type of product. 
The equation to be estimated may be written as follows: 
(54  log S, =  CX,  + pi,(lOg KL,) + P;?i(lOg HCi) 
+ P3j(log MEi) + P4jk  oil 
+ P,j(log  INi) + ~jAij9 
where S, is the market share of country i in product j,  KL is the physical 
capital/labor ratio in country i, HC is the human capital intensity, ME is 
total manufactured exports, D is the distance between country i and the 
United States, IN is the U.S. direct investment/GNP ratio in country i, 
and A, is the actual preference margin on product j  for country i.  This 
equation was estimated for a sample of  fifteen products defined at the 
four-digit level of  the SIC. These products were selected because they 
were identified from ex ante calculations by Baldwin and Murray (1977) 
and Bayard and Moore (1979) of the Department of Labor as having the 
largest expected GSP effects. For each product, the estimation was made 
on a sample of  thirty-six countries (of which eighteen were GSP ben- 
eficiaries) for both 1975 and 1979.29 
The estimation  results indicate that model  (5a) performs generally 
well. As appendix table 6.A.1 shows, the coefficients of the manufactur- 
ing exports and direct investment variables have the expected positive 
sign in all cases, and most are strongly significant. The coefficient for the 
distance variable is negative, as expected in most cases, but generally not 
significant. The coefficients for the measures of  physical  and human 
capital intensity show varying signs and are in most cases not significant. 
The explanatory value of  the regression varies between  .4 and .8. 
As far as the preference margin variable is concerned, the results in the 
left panel of table 6.4 show a positive and significant coefficient  in 1979  for Table 6.4  Coefficient Estimates for the Preference Variables: Cross-Country Model 
SIC 
Code  Description 
Equation (5a):  Actual  Equation (6a): Share Changes“ 
Share Levels”  Preference  Preference Variables Included 
Marginb 

















Softwood veneer and plywood  37.0 
Furniture and fixtures, nec.  48.9 
Luggage  139 
Electronic computing equipment  144 
Accounting machines  151 
73.8  .95 
36.8  13.30 
66.6  6.88 
55.7  4.47 
69.3  .19 
81.3  .79 















-  1.6 
-  1703 
( -  6.5) 
-21.4 
( -  .3) 
(- 4 
-  331 
(3.7)  (3.9) 
24.2  24.2 
(4.2)  (4.3) 
(9.1)  (4.3) 
(- .4)  (- 1.2) 
(1.5)  (1.3) 
1227  745 
-  37.5  -55.1 
100  69.2 3651  Radios and TVs  146  147  .64  -  192  39.2  33.9 
3911  Jewelry, precious metal  16.5  31.4  9.07  -  95.5  9.7  -  10.6 
(2.7)  (2.7)  (-3.1)  (9.2)  (7.7) 
(2.1)  (2.9)  ( -  .9)  (4  (e.3) 
(1.1)  (2.5)  (- 4  (1.1)  (1.1) 
(-.I)  (- 1.1)  (- 1.6)  ( -  .3)  (-4 
(4  (1.8)  (1.1)  (.7)  (1.0) 
(1.2)  (2.6)  (4  (6.9)  (7.0) 
3914  Silverware  9.7  24.7  3.33  -9.3  13.9  13.5 
3915  Jewelers' materials  -  .87  -  14.8  .81  -99.1  -  2.5  -  1.7 
3942  Dolls  13.8  23.7  7.93  28.2  .6  .7 
3944  Games and toys  10.8  25.8  8.72  2.8  15.7  15.7 
3949  Sporting goods, nec.  45.6  55.7  6.11  3.7  21.8  21.9 
(2.1)  (3.2)  (4  (10.2)  (10.5) 
3691  Costume jewelry  1.03  12.3  15.66  3.5  2.5  2.9 
(4  (2.4)  (5)  (2.2)  (3.3) 
"The ?-statistics appear in the parentheses. 
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twelve out of our fifteen products.3°  However, a closer examination of the 
estimates shows that only some of these twelve cases reveal a GSP effect, 
since in some cases the A,  coefficient was also positive in 1975. For four 
products-silverware  (3914), dolls (3942), games and toys (3944), and 
costume jewelry (3961)-the  GSP coefficient increased substantially be- 
tween 1975 and 1979, was not significantly different from zero in 1975, 
and became significantly positive in  1979. For furniture  and fixtures 
(2599), jewelry, precious metal (3911), and sporting goods (3949), the 
coefficient also increased but was already significant in 1975. For those 
three products, the results indicate that the model omits an explanatory 
variable, the effect of which gives a bias to the A,  coefficient. If the bias is 
assumed to be constant, the increase of  the coefficient indicates a GSP 
effect. For the other products there is no indication of  any GSP effect, 
since the y coefficients did not increase. 
The differences in the GSP effect among products seem to be associ- 
ated with differences in average actual preference margins. The figures in 
the middle panel of  table 6.4 indicate that, except for softwood veneer 
and plywood (2436), the products for which the preference coefficient  has 
not increased at all were  granted very  low  preference margins (1.42 
percent on average). At the other end of the spectrum, the four products 
with the strongest GSP effects had preference margins averaging 8.91 
percent  PI 
An alternative approach for the evaluation of  GSP effects with the 
cross-country model is to estimate equation (6), which relates changes in 
U.S.  market shares to  the preference margins for our thirty-six supplying 
countries. The explanatory variables are different than those in equation 
(5a). We assume that the change in the market share of a country depends 
on its rate of  increase of  production capacity, measured here by  the 
growth rate of  GNP (GN,), and on the rate of  change of  export prices 
(PXJ.3’ The higher the GNP growth and the lower the price increase, the 
more we expect the market share of  a country to increase. Finally, as 
before, we allow for the possibility that changes in competitiveness of 
countries are linked to their relative endowments of physical and human 
capital (KL, and HCi). 
For several reasons, one would not expect the GSP effect on a coun- 
try’s market share to be simply proportional to the preference margin. 
First, given demand and supply elasticities, the increase of  the market 
share in percentage points will be greater, the higher the initial market 
~hare.3~  (There is obviously an upper limit to the possible increase.) 
Second, there may be a threshold effect; in the short period 1976-79, only 
the already established exporting countries, with already existing produc- 
tion and distribution capacity, may have been able to take advantage of 
the preference. Thus, the effect on countries whose initial shares were 
below a certain critical limit may have been virtually zero. We allow for 213  U.S. Generalized System of  Preferences 
these possibilities by including the preference variable A, in the regres- 
sion, together with an interaction term A$?  equal to the product of the 
preference margin and the initial share. 
The regression equation for the change in market share 1975-79  is: 
(64  ASq =  ~j  + b1;  GNj + b,  PXi + clj KLi 
+  ~2,  HCi + d,Aq  + dzjAijS:;. 
If  the coefficient of A,SF  is zero and that of A,  is positive, there is no 
threshold effect: whatever its initial share, every country benefits from 
the GSP. If  the coefficient of AqS? is positive and the coefficient of A,  is 
negative, there is a threshold effect: only when Si5 is larger than (- d,/ 
dzj)  does country i benefit from the GSP. A positive coefficient for both 
A,SF and A,  indicates that every country benefits from the GSP, but the 
extent of the gain for a particular country depends on its share of  the U.S. 
market in 1975. 
As shown in appendix table 6.A.2, model (6a) performs well for some 
products; for others, the explanatory value is low. In most cases the 
variables measuring capacity growth and export prices show the expected 
sign, but coefficients are mostly not significant. This is also true for the 
factor endowments variables. 
The results for the coefficients of the preference margin variables are 
shown in the right panel of table 6.4 for two sets of regressions, the second 
of which includes only the interaction terms AijSF  Apparently this term 
captures most of the GSP effect; it is significantly positive for eight out of 
fifteen products, regardless of whether Aqis present or not. For most of 
these eight products, the A, coefficient is not significant. For luggage 
(3161) and radios and TVs (3651), however, it is significantly negative. 
The calculated critical share levels for these two products is .14 and .49 
percent, re~pectively?~  For luggage, this means that only countries with at 
least .14 percent of  the U.S. market in 1975 actually gained from the 
GSP. These countries were Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, and 
Taiwan. For radios and TVs, the actual gainers were countries already 
with at least .49 percent of the market in 1975,  that is, Brazil, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Malyasia,  Philippines,  and Taiwan. These two products have 
enjoyed only very small preference margins. Among the other six prod- 
ucts with a significant GSP effect on share changes, four also showed signs 
of  a GSP effect based on the estimation of  regressions on share levels. 
These four products (i.e., 2599, 3944, 3949, and 3961) enjoyed large 
preference margins ranging from 6.1 to 15.7 percent. 
The Cross-  Product Model 
Another way of evaluating the effects of  GSP is to use model (3), the 
cross-product model, to test whether the preference variable Aq  helps to 214  Andre SapidLars Lundberg 
explain the product composition of  U.S. imports from a particular sup- 
plier or group of suppliers, that is, to explain interproduct differences in 
market shares. 
Since physical and human capital can be assumed to be scarce factors in 
GSP beneficiary countries, we would expect the market share for these 
countries in a given year to be low for human- and physical-intensive 
products. Also, we would expect the market share to be high for products 
with a high preference margin. 
The cross-product model could be expressed, alternatively, as deter- 
mining the levels of  market shares in different periods (eq. [7]), or as 
determining the changes of market shares from a base year to a year after 
the tariff changes (eq. [S]). In the latter case, the higher the preference 
granted for a product, the larger we  expect the increase in GSP ben- 
eficiaries’ market share to be. We have estimated both variants, for the 
market shares of imports from beneficiaries (i = B), nonbeneficiaries (i 
= N), and for total imports (i = T), for a sample of  up to 208  product^?^ 
However, the regressions on share levels for 1975 and 1979 resulted in 
negative values for the coefficient of the preference variable for all three 
groups, including the beneficiaries’ share in 1979?6  The explanation is 
straightforward. First, MFN tariffs have distorted the composition of 
U.S. imports against products with high tariffs. Since the period 1975-79 
is very short, full adjustment to the GSP has not taken place and this 
distortion still prevailed  for beneficiary imports in  1979. Second, the 
preference margins (A,) are positively correlated with the MFN tariffs, 
that is, in absolute terms the larger the tariff, the larger the preference 
margin. The combination of  these two factors produces the negative 
“effect .” 
For changes in market shares, we have estimated the equation: 
ASij =  U: + cii KLj +  C&  HCj + d;jABj 
+ d;i  (ABjSg)  > 
where AS, is the change of  the market share for product j  for country 
group i, KLj  and HCj are the physical and human capital intensities of 
product j,  ABj  the weighted average of the individual beneficiaries’ A,’s 
for product J, and Sg  the initial market share of  beneficiaries. That the 
factor intensity levels, and not the changes, enter the equations means 
that the model describes a process of  adjustment of  the actual trade 
structure to an equilibrium  structure determined by  comparative ad- 
vantage. A  change of  the structure of  U.S. imports from developing 
countries toward products intensive in unskilled labor would then be 
expressed in negative coefficients for KL  and HC in the equation for 
beneficiaries’ share. The justification for including the preference vari- 
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Table 6.5  Coefficient Estimates for the Cross-Product Model (8a) 
Explanatory Variables 
Country 
Group  KI,  HC  AB  ABSg  RZ 
Beneficiaries  -  ,353  -  .39  -  .29  11.08  .59 
Nonbeneficiaries  .15  .60  -  .29  2.07  .02 
(.3)“  (1.5)  (3.2)  (15.4) 
(.I)  (1.1)  (1.5)  (1.3) 
Total 
”The t-statistics appear in the parentheses. 
equation (6a). The results from the estimation of  equation (8a) with a 
sample of  208 products appear in table 6.5. 
The coefficients of  KL and HC have the expected signs but are gen- 
erally not significant. The estimates of the preference coefficients indicate 
the presence of (net) trade creation as well as gross trade creation, since 
the increase in the market shares for total imports, as well as for imports 
from beneficiaries, tend to be higher, the higher the preference is. There 
is no clear sign of  trade diversion, that is, the preference variable is not 
significant in the equation for nonbeneficiaries. However, the effect of 
GSP on the market share for these countries can easily be obtained, given 
the effect on imports from beneficiaries and on total imports. For all these 
country groups, there seems to exist a strictly positive critical share level. 
The beneficiaries equation indicates the presence of gross trade creation 
for all products for which SF  was greater than 2.6 percent. The equation 
for total imports indicates that U.S. producers lost market shares as a 
result of  the GSP when S:  was greater than 4.5 percent. 
6.4.3  Calculating the GSP Effect on U.S. Trade and Production 
The results of the estimation of our regression equations for both the 
cross-country  and  the cross-product  models  indicate  that  the  GSP 
appears to have had a statistically significant effect on U.S. trade. Of 
course, it is difficult to argue that we have managed to isolate entirely the 
GSP from other factors affecting market shares. Hence, our estimation 
results must be used with considerable caution. This should be especially 
the case when using the coefficients of  the preference variables to com- 
pute the GSP effects. 
As we have mentioned earlier, the coefficients from the cross-country 
equations are not really well suited for the calculation of  the GSP effects 
because of the absence of “normal trade.” In addition, a major problem 
with these equations is that A, is correlated with the level of  economic 216  Andre SapidLars Lundberg 
development and therefore with country characteristics. Accordingly, 
the coefficient of this variable may tend to capture some of the effects of 
an increase in competitiveness for beneficiaries unrelated to preferences. 
In fact, an attempt to compute the GSP effects with the coefficients of 
equation (6a) gives, for some of  our fifteen products, figures that are 
unreasonably high.  Consequently, we limit ourselves to computations 
based on the cross-product equation (8a) where we have no reason to 
suspect a correlation between A, and product characteristics. 
Using the results from table 6.5, we have computed the GSP effects 
reported in table 6.6.3’ Out of the 208 products in the sample, there were 
thirty-three for which we found a positive GTC effect. The total effect 
amounted to $930 million, of which 95 percent was accounted for by the 
top twenty products. Not surprisingly, ten of the fifteen products used in 
the cross-country regression because of their expected large GSP effects 
were found to have a positive GTC  effect. In general our results indicate 
that trade creation is about two-and-one-half times larger than trade 
diversion. 
For the sake of comparison, we have supplemented the results in table 
6.6 with estimates of the GSP’s trade creation effects based on the ex ante 
methods, using the formula 
(9)  AMij = M, -qj [Pv/(l  + ti)], 
where Mv is the imports from beneficiary countries in 1979, -qj is the 
import demand elasticity,  the MFN tariff rate, and P, the preference 
Expression (9) has been calculated for all GSP beneficiaries 
and eligible products in two alternative fashions. In the first, we set Pij 
equal to the MFN tariff  (i.e., the theoretical preference margin) as if no 
limitations affected GSP treatment. In the second alternative, we take 
into account the actual restrictive effects of  the GSP rules by setting Pjj 
equal to the actual preference margin A, derived from equation (1). 
The results of  these  computations,  aggregated  by  product  and by 
country, are shown in table 6.7 and 6.8, respectively. These figures 
represent the hypothetical decrease in imports that would have occurred 
in 1979 if  preferences had been eliminated. They are purely indicative 
and should not be read literally!*  Essentially, the products emerging here 
as having the largest effects from the GSP also show up in our ex post 
computations: games and toys, wood products, jewelry, sporting goods, 
and pottery products. For all GSP eligible products, expression (9) gives 
a total TC  effect of $2.2 billion when the theoretical preference margin is 
used. On the other hand, the effect obtained by using the APM is $1.3 
billion. The difference between these two figures is an estimate of  the 
impact of  GSP limitations on eligible products.  As one would have 
expected, some of  the products that have a very high TPM suffer heavily 
from these  limitations. This is  especially the case for toys and parts 217  U.S. Generalized System of  Preferences 
(73795), sugar (15520), and rubber or plastic household articles (77215). 
Yet, on the whole, the top twenty products, with a ratio of APM to TPM 
of 63 percent, are less subject to limitations than the remaining eligible 
products, for which the equivalent ratio is barely 56 percent. 
The figures in table 6.8 indicate a very high concentration of  the TC 
effect in favor of  Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, which account for 
two-thirds of the total effect. Moreover, the top ten countries share 90 
percent of  this effect.  As we have already seen (see table 6.2), GSP 
limitations affect individual suppliers to rather different degrees. For the 
leading trio, the average APM/TPM ratio is about 60 percent but with 
great variations between Hong Kong (36 percent) and Korea (71 per- 
cent). For the top ten countries, as well as for all the other beneficiaries, 
this ratio is roughly the same. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, competitive 
need limitations do not seem to discriminate against either the big ex- 
porters or countries with the largest gains from the GSP. 
Given the effects of  the GSP on U.S. imports of  different products 
presented in the TC  column in table 6.6, the effects on U.S. employment 
can be computed by  assuming that increased imports replace domestic 
production on a dollar-for-dollar basis. This can be done by multiplying 
the figures in table 6.6 by the corresponding coefficients  for labor require- 
ments per million U.S.  dollars of production for 1979. These calculations 
indicate that the direct effect of  the GSP in those twenty industries that 
account for most of the trade effects amounts to a loss of 24,000 jobs. By 
using the coefficients of the U.S. input-output table, it is possible to also 
compute  the indirect reduction in  employment  caused by  the fall in 
demand for intermediate goods as a result of the GSP. The total (direct 
plus indirect) employment effect of  the GSP is estimated to be a loss of 
43,000 jobs. The biggest effects occur in the industries producing games 
and toys, dolls, and artificial flowers. In table 6.9 the employment effects 
have also been distributed by skill categories. The table shows that the 
employment of  operative personnel is most affected. 
The figures in table 6.9 cannot be interpreted as the net increase in 
unemployment in the United States caused by the GSP, nor the increase 
in total employment to be expected if the GSP were abolished. We would 
expect the GSP to result in an increase in employment in other parts of 
the economy, since increased imports from beneficiaries means an in- 
crease in demand for U.S. exports. 
6.5  Policy Issues and Conclusions 
In the previous section, we have attempted to identify the effects of the 
GSP on developing country exports to the United States and on U.S. 
production and employment for 1975-79. This type of exercise is compli- 
cated because so many factors influence trade besides tariffs. This has Table 6.6  Effects of the GSP on Imports from Beneficiary Countries for 1979 ($ million) Estimates Derived from Cross-Product  Regressions 
TCSIC  1972 SIC 
Code  Code  Description 
Imports from 
GSP 
























Games and toys 
Dolls 
Feathers and artificial 
Manufacturers, nec. 
Wood products, nec. 
Costume jewelry 
Rubber footwear 
Sporting and athletic goods, 
Lapidary work 
Radio and TV receiving sets 
Pottery products, nec. 























































4,536.8 3171  - 
3339  - 
2819  - 
3662  - 
3699  - 
3614  - 
3943  3944 
All above products 
All manufactured products 
Women's handbags and purses 




Radio and TV communication 
equipment 





















0.0'  256.2 
0.0  1,038.6 
12.7  285.9 
12.0  1,005.8 
2.3  102.3 
0.0'  1,852.3 
3.6  46.3 
248.5 
210.4 
"Calculated with equation (8a), for i = B. 
bCalculated with equation @a), for i  = N. 
'Calculated with equation (8a), for i  = T. 
dA  line means that the SIC and TCSIC codes are identical. 
"The estimated TD effect was negative and set equal to zero. 
fThe estimated TC effect was negative and set equal to zero. 220  Andre SapirILars Lundberg 
Table 6.7  Effects of the GSP on Imports from Beneficiaries for 1979 
($ millions) Estimates Calculated from Equation (9) 
Trade Creation  Imports 
TSUS  from GSP 
























Toys and parts 
Toy animals 
Jewelry 
Furniture of  wood 
Household articles of  rubber/plastic 
Other furniture nes. 
Pipe tools, wrenches, etc. 
Articles of  rubber/plastic nes. 
Airplanes 
Fur wearing apparel 
Machine tools 
Ski equipment 





All above products 
All GSP eligible products 
46.0  47.5  56.3 
40.7  57.0  70.1 
33.9  34.5  83.0 
37.7  143.8  256.5 
32.4  36.1  64.4 
29.6  52.3  131.1 
29.3  30.8  113.9 
25.5  26.0  55.4 
23.7  25.0  45.9 
23.2  23.5  62.3 
18.6  62.2  133.4 
17.4  18.1  63.4 
17.2  17.5  51.0 
16.7  16.9  78.3 
16.2  16.4  52.8 
15.9  16.0  47.0 
15.6  19.1  38.9 
15.0  15.2  27.1 
14.9  25.2  44.7 
14.6  68.3  880.0 
479.1  763.4  - 
1,291.3  2,218.2  - 
"Since sugar is also protected by quotas, this import effect is not likely to be realized. 
Table 6.8  Effects of the GSP on the Main Beneficiaries in 1979 ($ millions) 
Estimates Calculated from Equation (9) 
Trade Creation  GSP 
Eligible 
















































11,725 Table 6.9  Effects of the GSP on U.S. Employment 
Direct 
Effects  Direct Plus Indirect Effects 
TCSIC  All Skill  All Skill  Professional,  Clerical,  Labor, 
Code  Groups  Groups  Management  Sales  Craftsmen  Operatives  Service  Farmers 
3941  2,181  4,198  683  806  694  1,652  347  12 
3942  2,964  5,705  927  1,095  943  2,245  471  16 
3962  3,439  6,045  941  1,245  934  2,427  412  93 
3999  2,430  4,211  665  796  699  1,690  344  17 
2499  52  90  12  11  14  39  14  0 
3961  1,795  3,205  505  609  549  1,290  247  5 
3021  2,672  3,985  563  624  532  1,891  360  15 
3949  702  1,371  22 1  259  227  529  129  6 
3913  1,596  2,851  449  542  488  1,147  220  5 
3651  837  2,673  60 1  489  420  957  202  4 
3269  1,864  1,920  230  233  228  1,024  203  2 
2432  588  1,389  168  150  218  445  393  15 
2911  68  322  78  78  56  66  42  2 
3171  1,477  2,430  289  379  309  1,274  147  32 
3339  419  915  154  168  186  297  107  3 
2819  - 
3662  -  - 
3699  358  596  123  104  86  232  50  1 
3614  375  621  138  107  79  250  46  1 
3943  24 1  643  75  89  77  183  38  1 
All above 
-  -  -  -  -  -  - 
-  -  -  -  -  - 
products  23,858  42,985  6,822  7,784  6,739  17,638  3,772  230 222  Andre SapirILars Lundberg 
been especially the case during the seventies, when major disturbances 
have affected world trade on both  the demand and supply sides.  In 
particular, the acquisition of  know-how by leading developing countries 
and their promotion of manufactured exports have resulted in increased 
international competitiveness, which has coincided with the operation of 
the GSP. For these reasons, and because it has been rather limited in 
scope, the effects of  the GSP on the performance of developing countries 
in the US. market are difficult to evaluate. 
By designing a methodology enabling us to investigate U.S. imports for 
individual countries and products, we have attempted to  isolate the GSP 
from other determinants of trade. In our cross-country models, we can 
only claim partial success because our sample design is such that, in some 
cases, the GSP variable tends to reflect other factors besides tariff prefer- 
ences. In this respect, we fared better with our cross-product models for 
which no such problem seems to arise. 
Our cross-country regression  results clearly indicate  that  the  GSP 
program has affected trade flows for products enjoying large preference 
margins. The results of  our cross-product regression also indicate the 
presence of positive GSP effects on imports from beneficiaries, but only 
in cases where these countries were already major suppliers before 1976. 
Our regression results indicate that a beneficiary country is more likely to 
gain from the GSP for a certain eligible product the larger both the 
preference margin and the share in the U.S. market that was already 
acquired prior to  1976. Obviously, this conclusion to a large extent 
reflects the fact that the period covered by our investigation is extremely 
short. 
Using the results of our cross-product regressions to estimate the GSP 
effects, we obtain a gross trade creation effect of nearly $1 billion, which 
amounts to 15 percent of GSP duty-free imports and 2 percent of  total 
imports from beneficiaries by the United States in 1979. Computations 
based  on the traditional formula of  ex ante studies, but using actual 
instead of theoretical preference margins, gave somewhat larger effects:' 
The trade creation effect, which according to economic theory will lead to 
an increase in economic welfare in the United States, is more than twice 
the amount of the trade diversion effect, which  is welfare-reducing. 
Although the overall effects tend to be small, they are large for certain 
products. Moreover, the effects  tend to be concentrated to a few products 
with high margins and large initial market shares for beneficiaries. Fi- 
nally, the effects are unevenly distributed among beneficiary countries. 
It is likely that the period  1975-79  was too short to allow for the 
emergence of  the full effects of  the GSP, in particular with respect to 
exports of new products by developing countries or new suppliers of more 
traditional items. In addition, uncertainties related to the functioning of 
the system have probably also restricted the increase of  exports from 223  U.S. Generalized System of  Preferences 
beneficiaries. Indeed, the way competitive need limitations are designed, 
it is sometimes difficult to assess whether or when a particular supplier 
will lose its beneficiary status for a given product. For instance, of  the 
forty-two TSUS items for which India lost this status from January 1976 
through March 1983, the average period without preferences was three 
years, often not consecutive; only for three products did India not receive 
GSP treatment throughout the entire seven years. 
Since March 1981, a system of “discretionary graduation” has added a 
new source of  uncertainty. Under this additional limitation to the GSP 
scheme,  every March the U.S.  administration  permanently  removes 
certain countries from GSP eligibility on certain products in response to 
petitions filed by U.S. producers or labor unions. Removal decisions are 
based  on a country’s level of  development,  its competitiveness in  a 
specific  product, and the overall economic interests of the United States. 
So far, the top seven beneficiaries-Taiwan,  Korea, Hong Kong, Mex- 
ico,  Brazil,  Singapore,  and  Israel-have,  to  varying  degrees,  been 
affected by discretionary graduation. For most products, these countries 
were already affected  by competitive need limitations. Some U.S. impor- 
ters have been complaining that the rules governing discretionary gradua- 
tion are too vague and give rise to arbitrary decisions by the administra- 
tion. 
This new system is only one of several alternative graduation schemes 
being considered in the United States for phasing the dominant suppliers 
out of the GSP program.  Other options include: changes in product 
coverage to eliminate additional import-sensitive products, changes in 
country coverage to exclude countries above a certain per capita GNP 
line, or changes in GSP limitations. 
The first step in reviewing these alternative options is to specify the 
different  and  sometimes conflicting objectives  of  the U.S.  GSP,  as 
reflected in guidelines of the U.S. GSP which specify the need to consider 
the effect of  preferences on the level of  economic development of  de- 
veloping countries as well as on U.S. producers. 
The GSP should promote exports and economic growth, in particular, 
for countries at the lowest level of development-measured,  for instance, 
by the per capita income. In addition, an objective for U.S. trade policy 
in general presumably is to promote an efficient production structure by 
increased international division of labor. These objectives would call for 
a GSP designed to result in trade creation. On the other hand, from a 
protectionist perspective, the ideal GSP, that is, one that helps develop- 
ing countries without hurting U.S. producers, would be a scheme that 
generates only trade diversion. The exclusion of  certain products from 
the GSP clearly serves a purely protectionist purpose. These exclusions 
can be expected to be products with large imports and high comparative 
costs because of low requirements for human skills and technical knowl- 224  Andre SapidLars Lundberg 
edge. In this case, countries on the lowest level of  development can be 
expected to suffer greatly from limited product coverage. On the other 
hand, competitive need limitations might, in principle, favor both U.S. 
producers and low-income developing countries at the expense of  large 
and established developing country exporters. Whether, indeed, these 
limitations benefit  the poorest  developing countries needs to be ex- 
amined. One measure of the impact of competitive need limitations on 
beneficiary countries is  the ratio  between  the actual and theoretical 
preference margins reported in table 6.2, column (7). A system of limita- 
tions that benefits the poorest countries would imply a negative correla- 
tion between this ratio and an index of the level of development, like per 
capita GNP. From the figures in table 6.2, this does not seem to be the 
case."*  Thus, one suspects that the main effect of competitive need limita- 
tions has been to protect U.S. producers rather than redistribute the 
benefits of the GSP to the least developed countries. 
Graduation could be viewed as a new instrument aimed at helping the 
poorest developing countries benefit from the GSP. However, the target- 
ing of the largest (rather than the richest) beneficiaries seems to indicate 
that, for the moment, graduation is simply another manifestation  of 
protectionismP3  Yet it is legitimate for graduation to go hand in hand with 
the concept of  preferences. What is needed is for instruments like com- 
petitive need limitations or graduation to be clearly aimed at clearly 
stated objectives. 
Granted that the objectives of the GSP are to  promote industrialization 
in the developing countries (especially the poorest ones) and the interna- 
tional division of labor according to  comparative advantage-subject  to a 
relatively smooth adjustment of U.S.  producers: How should a desirable 
GSP program be designed? To our mind, such a program should be 
comprised of three elements. First, its product coverage should be wid- 
ened as much  as possible to include those products where the least 
developed countries are likely to be most competitive. Second, competi- 
tive need limitations should be connected to the level or the rate of 
increase of import penetration in general, not to exports from individual 
countries; also, they could be linked to an injury test. Finally, graduation 
should become a rule and be based on the stage of development (mea- 
sured, for instance, by the per capita income) rather than on the size of 
exports. The innovative aspect of  this package is the trade-off between 
graduation and wider product coverage. 
So far only a limited number of products and countries have actually 
been affected by the GSP. This is the result of both the short time and the 
limited scope of its operation. The modesty of its success is also related to 
the complexity of  the scheme which has recently increased  with the 
introduction of graduation. The forthcoming review of the GSP by Con- 225  U.S. Generalized System of  Preferences 
gress will  decide on its future shape  and especially on the future of 
graduation. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to a better under- 
standing of  the GSP and help in making future choices. 
Appendix 
1. Tariff preferences are granted to GSP-eligible products defined at 
the five-digit level of the tariff schedule of the United States (TSUS). For 
each of these products a yearly computer tape available from the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) provides data on total imports, 
imports from all nonbeneficiaries, imports from each beneficiary country 
distinguishing between duty-free and MFN (i.e., GSP-excluded) trade, 
and the ad valorem MFN tariff rate. These data were used to construct 
table 6.2. 
2.  In addition to the above data, the ex ante computation underlying 
table 6.7 and 6.8 also required estimates of  import demand elasticities. 
These were generously provided  by  Robert Baldwin for all products 
defined at the four-digit level of  the 1967 Input-Output (1-0) industry 
classification. Import demand elasticities for five-digit TSUS products 
were derived by matching the 1-0  and TSUS classifications. 
3.  Ex post computations required first the construction of the shares of 
imports in U.S. apparent consumption, where apparent consumption is 
defined as the sum of domestic production and imports minus exports. 
This was done for all products defined at the four-digit level of the 1972 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
4.  To approximate the GSP product coverage, we restricted ourselves 
to manufactured products, that is, SIC codes 2011 through 3999, and 
excluded the following items: 
2011-2099,  food and kindred products; 
21  11-2141,  tobacco manufactures; 
2211-2299,  textile mill products; 
231  1-2399,  apparel and other textile products; 
3131-3149,  footwear and footwear cut stock; 
3211, flat glass; and 
3873, watches. 
5. The figures in table 6.3 were computed using four-digit SIC data. 
6.  In addition to market share data, the cross-country equations of 
section 6.4.2 required country characteristics. These were obtained as 
follows: 
a. Data on the physical capitalAabor ratio (KL) and human capital 
(HC) were generously provided by Bela Balassa. The beneficiary 226  Andre SapirILars Lundberg 
countries (eighteen in all) included in the regressions are: Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Singapore,  Taiwan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; the  nonbeneficiary 
Table 6.A. 1  &Values  for the Coefficients of Equation (5a) Estimated for 1979 
Explanatory Variables 
SIC 
Code”  KL  HC  ME  D  IN  A  R2 
2435  -  .62  -.34  2.51  .70  2.68  .88  .41 
2436  .30  -  .70  1.60  -  1.57  1.38  1.85  .43 
2599  .44  1.06  4.45  -  1.27  1.69  3.67  .67 
3079  .80  .43  5.62  -.89  3.46  3.41  .76 
3161  -2.37  .98  4.14  -  1.97  .25  .70  .so 
3573  -1.18  .51  6.48  -2.22  3.69  3.09  .81 
3574  -  .91  -  .12  7.13  -2.19  2.68  3.80  .82 
3651  .I0  -  1.94  3.71  -.69  3.83  2.72  .53 
3911  .80  -  .45  3.83  .58  2.23  2.89  .55 
3914  -  1.22  .29  5.71  -  .83  .95  2.50  .61 
3915  -  1.58  -  .54  3.65  .25  1.13  -  1.12  .45 
3942  -  1.87  1.40  3.84  -  1.02  1.59  1.76  .55 
3944  -  1.33  1.53  5.36  -  .49  1.53  2.60  .67 
3949  .10  .93  4.84  -.40  1.00  3.16  .68 
3961  -  .32  -  .63  4.45  .41  3.12  2.41  .57 
”For the description of  the products, see table 6.4. 
Table 6.A.2  t-Values for the Coefficients of Equation (6a) Estimated for 1975-79 
Explanatory Variables 
SIC 
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-  .16 
-  .87 
.77 
-  .16 
-  .41 
-  .76 
-  .84 
-  1.12 
-  .14 
-  .94 
-  .37 
-  .95 
-  .81 
-  .23 
-  .85 
1.17 
-  .75 
-  .44 
1.17 
.68 
-  .33 
-  .27 
-  .12 
-  .01 
-  .72 
-  .36 
-  .36 
-  1.26 
1.99 
1.37 
-  .92 
1.35 
-  .04 
.94 
-  .46 
1.67 
1.78 
-  .09 
-  .07 
.86 
-  .77 
.76 
1.18 
-  .65 
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countries included  (also eighteen)  are:  Australia,  Austria, Bel- 
gium-Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
b. Data on manufactured exports (ME) were derived from Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, and 
the World Bank, World Development Report. 
c. The ratio of  U.S. investment to GNP (IN) was derived from U.S. 
Department of  Commerce, Selected Data on U.  S. Direct Investment 
Abroad 1950-76,  1982. 
d. Data on sea distances (D)  were taken from U.S. Naval Oceano- 
graphic Office, Distance Between Ports, 1965. 
e. The relative price variable  (PX) was constructed with data from 
IMF, International Financial Statistics as 
where WPI is the wholesale price index and EX the dollar exchange 
rate. 
7. Actual preference margins (A) for each beneficiary country and 
each product were computed on the basis of duty collected and custom 
values for seven-digit TSUS products. The aggregation to four-digit SIC 
products and to countries was made over MFN dutiable trade only. 
8. The cross-product equations of section 6.4.2 required industry char- 
acteristics. These were taken from the U.S. International Trade Commis- 
sion’s data bank which uses its own industry classification called TCSIC. 
This classification is closely related to the 1967 SIC. We had to aggregate 
our four-digit 1972 SIC  market share and preference data into the four- 
digit TCSIC. This was done with a concordance developed in great part 
by Steve Parker. 
9.  Most of  the trade and production data described in this appendix 
belong  to the data base  developed  at  the University  of  Wisconsin- 
Madison with financial support from the U.S. Department of  Labor. 
PX = (WP179/WP175)/(EX79/EX75), 
Notes 
1. For further details about the origin of preferences  see UNCTAD (1979, chap. 1) and 
2.  See U.S. Congress (1967, 79). 
3. The EEC GSP which originally was  also granted for ten years has already been 
4.  The operation of the GSP during its first five years is reviewed in  U.S. Congress 
5. The last three conditions may be waived if the president determines that doing so is in 
Murray (1977, chap 1). 
renewed for another ten years. 
(1980). 
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6. Hence, the developing countries which are nonbeneficiaries of  the U.S. GSP are: 
China and the other communist countries, except Romania and Yugoslavia; the OPEC 
members, except Ecuador, Indonesia,  and Venezuela which  were designated as ben- 
eficiaries effective 30 March 1980; Greece and Spain which grant preferences to the EEC 
(Portugal became a beneficiary on 1  October 1976, following its decision to reduce prefer- 
ences for EEC countries on products of interest to the United States); a few countries which 
have  expropriated  US.-owned  property  without  compensation  (P.D.R.  of  Yemen, 
Uganda up to 30 March 1980, and Ethiopia since that date). 
7. The GSP schemes of the other major industrialized  countries contain similar disposi- 
tions. 
8. Section 503 does not specify which electonric, steel, and glass articles are import 
sensitive. The precise determination is made by the president in consultation with various 
parties  on the  basis of  the probable  economic effects of  GSP treatment  on domestic 
producers of  similar products. 
9.  See Office of  the U.S. Trade Representative (1981, 64-70;  1982, 1). 
10. The U.S. GSP contains provisions of  cumulative origin for beneficiary countries 
11. This argument is developed by Murray (1977, 89-92). 
12. This limitation does not apply to eighty-three products which the Trade Policy Staff 
Committee considers as not being produced in the United States. For their list, see Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (1981). 
13. A de minimis provision effective since 30 March 1980 allows the president to waive 
this limitation in cases  where total U.S. imports of a product does not exceed a certain dollar 
value to be adjusted annually ($1 million for 1980). 
which are members of  designated regional economic associations. 
14. This value has grown from $26.6 million for 1976 to $50.9 million for 1982. 
15. The date for implementing annual competitive need exclusions and changes in the 
GSP product list was changed from sixty to ninety days after the end of  the calendar year 
starting in 1980. 
16. Obviously the only imports of eligible products actually receiving GSP treatment are 
those for which preferences are requested and rules of  origin are fulfilled. Also, it should be 
noted that during a calendar year (from January 1 through December 31) some imports 
would be duty-free and some at the MFN rate if  a change in GSP treatment occurred on 30 
March. 
17. Of the $30.6 billion excluded due to country restrictions, over 90 percent came from 
OPEC countries. Since the MFN duty on oil is very low, the loss of preferences from these 
restrictions is not very important. 
18. For surveys of methods and results, see Verdoorn and Van Bochove (1974), Selle- 
kaerts (1973), Corden (1975), and Baldwin (1983). 
19. For the remaining imports, the preference margin is actually equal to zero. 
20.  Note that although the TPM for a given product is the same across all GSP ben- 
eficiaries, the APM varies across countries. 
21.  See, for instance, ElTA (1972). 
22.  Examples of  the former category are Learner (1974) and Sapir and Lutz (1981); 
23.  Obviously, A,  is equal to zero when either i is a nonbeneficiary country or  j is not a 
24. This point is made by  McCulloch and Pinera (1977). 
25.  For the definition of  manufactures used throughout this section, see the appendix. 
26.  This is calculated for all four-digit SIC industries as the increase in the share of 
imports from GSP countries of  consumption, minus the loss (if  any) of  market share of 
nonbeneficiary countries. 
27.  The formula used to calculate the trend-adjusted increase in market shares in the 
period 1975-1979 is 
examples of  the latter are Baldwin (1979) and Branson and Monoyios (1977). 
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dS" = S79 -  [4(S75 -  S7$3  + $51, 
where S79  is the 1979 market share, and the expression in brackets is the projected share in 
1979 obtained by extrapolating the 1972-1975  trend. In those cases where dS* exceeds the 
actual change dS, the trend-adjusted value is set equal to dS. If dS* is negative, the adjusted 
value is set equal to zero. 
28.  The variables used in the equations are described in greater detail in the appendix. 
29.  Their list is given in the appendix. 
30.  The three products with nonsignificant coefficients are 2435 (hardwood veneer and 
plywood), 3161 (luggage), and 3915 (jewelers'  materials). 
31.  The other three products showing some GSP effecte(2599) furniture and fixtures, 
(3911) jewelry, precious metal, and (3949) sporting goods-had  an average margin of  7.35 
percent. 
32.  To measure growth of  supply capacity we used the rate of  growth of  real GDP 
instead of growth of manufacturing exports (ME in the previous model), since the latter 
could not be obtained in constant prices. We assume that a high rate of  increase of  export 
prices,  PX, results in a fall in the market share. (The definition of  PX is given in the 
appendix). A price index variable would be meaningless for the share level equation. 
33.  Let q  be the import-demand elasticity and E  the export-supply elasticity. For a given 
level of  consumption,  the market share change  is proportional to the product  of  the 
preference and the initial share: 
where At is the preference  and t the MFN tariff rate. 
34.  The critical share value (times 1,OOO) ST  is the solution to the equation 
where d,  and d,  are the estimated regression coefficients. 
35.  As we indicate in the appendix, the products used in these equations are defined at 
the four-digit level of  the TCSIC. The characteristics were not available for all products, 
hence the sample size varied according to the variables included in the model. 
36.  The estimation results for equation (7a) are not reported here for lack of  space. 
37.  These were computed as dliABj  + d2,(ABjSg). 
38.  For the various assumptions underlying the use of  this formula see, for instance, 
Baldwin and Murray (1977). 
39.  Since we are primarily interested in the effects of the GSP on US.  production, we 
disregard  the trade diversion.  In any event, its computation  required data not  readily 
available. 
40.  This latter problem could have been avoided if we had, instead, based our computa- 
tions on trade figures for 1975, that is, the last year before the introduction of  the GSP. 
However, we prefer our procedure because it does provide an estimate of  the value of  the 
GSP in 1979 which accounts for the autonomous growth of  U.S. imports from beneficiary 
countries between 1975 and 1979. 
41.  Part of  the reason for this is that the ex ante computations cover all products instead 
of  manufactures alone. In addition, as indicated in note 40, they tend to overestimate the 
effects. 
42.  A similar finding was made by Weston et al. (1980) for the EEC GSP. 
43.  For an interesting discussion of  the effects of  graduation  on the least developed 
countries, see U.S. Department of  Labor (1979). 230  Andre SapirILars Lundberg 
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Comment  Tracy Murray 
The paper by Sapir and Lundberg empirically examines the U.S. program 
of tariff preferences in favor of developing countries. Their objective is to 
quantify the effects of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
on (1) developing country exports to the United States and the distribu- 
tion of  such exports across products and across countries, and (2) U.S. 
production and employment of competing products in total and by sector. 
Noting that the authorizing legislation for the U.S.  GSP automatically 
terminates the program in January 1985 and that Congress is likely to 
incorporate a number of modifications in a renewed program, the authors 
also analyze the effects of selected modifications on developing country 
exports and U.S. production and employment. 
A casual reading of the paper is sufficient to convince any reader that 
the authors have done a careful  and professional job of  empirically 
examining a very complicated trade policy. Though the rigorous critic 
might be somewhat uncomfortable with their results, I find they meet the 
very important  test  of  “reasonableness.”  I find  no surprises in their 
results that (1) U.S. imports under the GSP program were stimulated by 
roughly 15 percent:  (2) that GSP benefits are heavily concentrated by 
product and by beneficiary developing country, and (3) that the adverse 
effects on U.S. production and employment are minimal. 
Given my general agreement with the empirical results and given that 
the focus of this conference is on trade policy, I have nothing more to say 
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about the impact of  the GSP as it is currently structured.  I am more 
interested in the alternative modifications that are likely to be incorpo- 
rated into a renewed GSP, the political process of which is already under 
way. 
The major issues of  controversy would include the following: 
the list of beneficiary developing countries and the extent to which 
reciprocal concessions might be required by the United States; 
the list  of  eligible products  and  the extent to which the poorer 
developing countries can benefit from a GSP program that excludes 
import-sensitive (generally labor-intensive) products; 
the desire to achieve a more equitable distribution of  GSP benefits 
across the developing  countries than  currently  occurs,  given the 
competitive need criteria and the discretionary graduation policy; 
the desire to safeguard US.  producers and workers in those isolated 
cases in which GSP trade might be unduly burdensome; and 
the problem  of  how  to improve  the  administration of  the GSP, 
especially the annual reviews resulting in modifications in the GSP 
due to the competitive need criteria and the more ad hoc alterations 
due to graduation, product review, etc. 
The authors examine several of these issues and are able to provide one 
very important insight. In particular, the competitive need criteria have 
not operated to promote GSP trade for the poorer beneficiaries at the 
expense of the more advanced beneficiaries, that is, it has not contributed 
to a more equitable sharing of GSP benefits across developing countries. 
Instead the effect of  the competitive  need  system is to benefit  U.S. 
production at the expense of the impacted beneficiaries (more advanced 
and less advanced). Unfortunately, the empirical results of the paper do 
not lend themselves to broader application regarding the issues of  con- 
cern. 
Nevertheless, the authors’ examinations of  the GSP (of the United 
States and of other donor countries) enable them to suggest answers to 
some of  the questions raised  above. They suggest “a  desirable GSP 
program . . . should be comprised of three elements.” First, expand the 
product coverage as much as possible to benefit the poorer beneficiaries. 
Second, since the competitive need criteria are not  a benefit-sharing 
technique  they should become  safeguard  measures  based  on import 
penetration and linked to an injury test; Third, graduation should be 
based on the stage of  development rather than produce-specific export 
performance. I find these three elements to be inadequate to deal with 
the political realities surrounding the GSP. 
In the first place, a renewal of the GSP is not a foregone conclusion. 
There is substantial political opposition to any GSP program involving a 
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advanced  developing countries are included in the GSP, the product 
coverage will be severely limited to the point that the least developed will 
benefit  minimally, if  at all.  For example, Belize in  Central America 
exports three types of  goods-sugar  (which is included in the GSP but 
subject to import quotas), citrus fruit juice, and roughly $5 million in 
textiles and apparel (mostly men’s and boys’ garments). Belize cannot 
and will not benefit from the U.S. GSP unless textiles and apparel are 
included; this situation is common among a large number of  the poorer 
developing countries. And even if  the top ten exporting beneficiaries 
(such as China-Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Brazil, etc.) were 
“graduated”  from the GSP, a number  of  middle  and lower income 
beneficiaries (such as India) have substantial capacities to export labor- 
intensive products to the point of  displacing domestic production and 
employment. Thus, there will have to be political compromises if  the 
GSP is to be renewed. And if  the U.S. GSP were not renewed, U.S. 
relations with the third world, to say nothing  about the other GSP- 
granting countries, would deteriorate dramatically. In fact, it should be 
recognized that the GSP is not really a trade policy at all but instead a 
policy to promote U.  S. relations with developing countries, especially 
those in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
A second point that should be emphasized is that the various aspects of 
the GSP are highly interdependent. As indicated above, a broad product 
coverage is inconsistent with a long beneficiary list. It is literally impossi- 
ble to design a straightforward GSP that equitably benefits all developing 
countries without adversely affecting U.S. producers and workers. Given 
this interdependence, I believe that even an “ideal”  GSP must be sig- 
nificantly more complicated than the authors suggest and must incorpo- 
rate political as well as economic considerations. 
At the risk of  sticking my foot in my mouth, I will venture to suggest 
that an “ideal” GSP program contains the following elements: 
1. To maximize the foreign policy benefits, the beneficiary list should 
be broad and in line with those of the other GSP-granting countries. The 
United  States  should  not  solicit  bilateral  reciprocal  concessions or 
attempt to coerce special behavior as a price for beneficiary status. The 
GSP benefits are not of sufficient importance to obtain large concessions 
from individual developing countries; small concessions are not worth the 
ill-will that would be generated. 
2.  The product list should be as broad as possible, taking into consid- 
eration the general beneficiary list and domestic producers and workers 
interests, that is, roughly as it is today. This, of course, poses a problem 
for the lower-income beneficiaries that simply cannot produce the manu- 
factured products covered by the current GSP program. There are two 
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trade policy will benefit some countries more than others; the goal of  an 
equitable distribution of benefits across developing countries is literally 
an impossible dream. 
A second approach would be to include in the authorizing legislation a 
provision for the selective inclusion of products of export interest to the 
least developed. Such a provision would be consistent with the interna- 
tional agreement on the desirability of special measures in favor of  the 
least developed among the developing countries. To safeguard the in- 
terests of the least developed as well as domestic producers and workers, 
the more competitive beneficiaries could be immediately denied GSP 
treatment on these products under a product-graduation provision (see 
below). 
3.  As reported by Sapir and Lundberg, the competitive need limita- 
tions do  not increase the GSP benefits of the poorer beneficiaries (though 
their share may increase by reducing total GSP trade). Also as pointed 
out, the competitive need limitations are  ill-designed  to safeguard domes- 
tic producers and workers. Thus, the concept should be discontinued. 
Politically, however, I suspect that some mechanism to graduate the 
more competitive beneficiaries will be included. The idea of graduation is 
that as a country develops it becomes more competitive. Eventually the 
country reaches a point that preferences are no longer justified. Finally, 
the country progresses to the point that it should join with the other 
more-developed countries and assist the less-advanced countries. The 
problem with administering graduation is that economic development is 
gradual and uneven. A country may be internationally competitive in 
some sectors and not in others; it may be competitive in the early stages of 
processing but not in the more advanced stages; it may be competitive in 
nontechnical standardized products but not in the more sophisticated 
products. Because of these complications, it would be literally impossible 
to establish objective criteria for the graduation of countries. Therefore, 
any attempts to graduate a country from the beneficiary group to the 
nonbeneficiary group would be arbitrary-and,  in all likelihood, politi- 
cal. There would undoubtedly be cases in which a particular beneficiary 
country would be graduated when other more advanced countries con- 
tinued to enjoy GSP treatment; some countries would be graduated from 
one or more of the GSP programs but not from others. 
A more logical, fair, and pragmatic approach would be to graduate 
countries gradually as their economies become more internationally com- 
petitive, that is, countries should be graduated product by product, where 
products  are defined by  stage of  processing as is commonly (though 
imperfectly) done in the Tariff Schedules of  the United States. Estab- 
lishing general objective graduation criteria is admittedly quite difficult. 
Some products require a larger scale of operation to be competitive than 
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import market is irrelevant in determining international competitiveness. 
The faults of the current competitive need criteria for graduation are 
obvious; however, I defy anyone to come up with rigorously justifiable 
criteria that can be made operational. 
To establish objective graduation criteria, a pragmatic compromise 
will have to be the answer. My suggestion is to make the criteria as simple 
as possible; that is, adopt a single-value limit. Though I do not know what 
the value should be, to be politically acceptible to the beneficiaries, I 
suggest that it be set at a level such that initial graduation (in aggregate 
value) be no larger than the current trade denied GSP treatment because 
of  the competitive need criteria. 
Finally, the graduation value limit should be completely separated 
from  any  safeguard mechanism  designed  to protect  the interests  of 
domestic producers  and workers.  It may  be desirable  to establish  a 
special graduation concept for products that might be selected for inclu- 
sion in the GSP to benefit the least-developed countries (see item 2. 
above). 
4. There should be an objective safeguard mechanism to protect the 
interests of domestic producers and workers. In designing such a provi- 
sion it must be noted that the elimination of GSP treatment will remedy 
import  injury only in those cases in which  GSP duty-free trade has 
significantly contributed to the injury in the first place. General import 
injury (i.e., caused by non-GSP imports) cannot be remedied by termi- 
nating GSP treatment; general import-relief action is needed. The re- 
sponsibility for administering such a safeguard could be assigned to the 
U.S.  International Trade Commission (ITC) since the problem is similar 
to the import-relief provisions of the Trade Act of  1974. To facilitate a 
prompt remedy when warranted, a temporary termination of GSP treat- 
ment could be established on the basis of preliminary findings, as under 
the countervailing duty provisions of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979. 
5. The annual administrative review to add products, delete products, 
announce the competitive need product-country list, implement discre- 
tionary graduation (and nonredesignation  of  competitive need items), 
etc., are more trouble than they are worth. Instead simply announce the 
cases of  graduation based on objective criteria and any GSP safeguard 
actions recommended by the U.S.  ITC (which would occur as conditions 
warrant). Arbitrary modifications in the program should not be made on 
an annual basis. Periodic reviews of the operation of the U.S.  GSP could 
be made, say, every five years. If  warranted, discretionary changes could 
be made at that time. 
Some of  these suggestions go beyond the scope of  the paper under 
discussion, especially those involving political considerations. Neverthe- 
less, I believe these suggestions are not drastically different from what the 
authors would propose, though we might disagree somewhat on indi- 236  Andre SapirILars Lundberg 
vidual points. More importantly, however, the results of  this paper do 
provide policymakers with important pieces of  information that are rel- 
evant to several issues that must be dealt with in establishing a new GSP. 
Thus, we must conclude that this paper does accomplish much of what the 
authors set out to do. 
Notes 
1. Baldwin and Murray (1977) estimated the GSP to stimulate trade by 25 percent using 
an ex ante technique and pre-GSP trade flows; Murray (1980) found an 18 percent impact 
during 1974-77  using an ex post method. 
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